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Abstract
The declaration of war in June of 1812 brought more questions than it did answers
for the United States. Economically, the government was not prepared to fund a war with
multiple fronts. To make matters worse, the government’s primary source of income was
through import duties, which they expected to decrease drastically as the war progressed.
Militaristically, the United States Navy was too small to offer the protection that was
needed from Britain, who possessed the world’s strongest navy at the time. Luckily for
the United States, Congress in conjunction with President James Madison authorized
privately owned ships to participate in the war effort. These ships worked to supplement
the United States Navy, while working primarily to disrupt the British shipping industry.
While this was their primary objective, privateers provided much more through their
involvement in the War of 1812.
This thesis looks at the contributions of American privateers during the War of
1812. The first chapter will look at the ways in which privateers negatively affected
British shipping and the British Royal Navy. The second chapter focuses on the ways in
which privateers were able to provide economic support to the United States, while
simultaneously hurting the British economy. Finally, the third chapter focuses on the
social aspect of privateering. This last chapter demonstrates the ways in which the men
aboard these ships viewed their actions as patriotic, as well the way writers and
newspaper editors viewed the actions at home.

v
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Introduction
At the onset of the War of 1812, Benjamin Brown, a poor adolescent from Salem,
Massachusetts, set out to join a privateering vessel. With high aspirations of economic
prosperity, Brown initially found no ships willing to take an undersized teenager who had
no experience at sea. Despite being rejected by numerous owners and captains, Brown
did not give up hope, eventually landing a job as a surgeon’s assistant on a privateering
vessel out of his home port. He, along with the rest of the crew, experienced a successful
and prosperous four months at sea. One specific capture of note was when they overtook
a British merchant vessel that was carrying cotton, sugar and dye woods. Three days
later, they were able to capture another vessel carrying 10,000 bales of cotton. Through
these early victories, privateering proved to be a rewarding economic endeavor for
Brown and the rest of the crew.1
Following the end of his first cruise, Brown sought out additional privateering
opportunities with the hopes of furthering his economic gain. Now having the experience
that most captains desired, Brown quickly found a job as a captain’s clerk aboard the
privateering vessel Frolic. It was aboard this ship that Brown noted the particularities of
the ship, paying close attention to the design of the ship’s narrow wedged hull and the tall
masts, which differed from the squared hull and shorter masts which the British
employed. While Brown found these designs odd, he later noted the speed that these
elements afforded the ship. Aboard this vessel, he and the rest of the crew found success
when they infiltrated a British convoy by flying the British colors. Once inside the
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convoy, Brown noted that they were able to capture and destroy multiple British
merchant vessels a day. In total, they were able to destroy twelve ships without being
caught by the British Royal Navy Escorts.2
However, not everything Brown recorded was about the captures and prizes he
and his shipmates were able to take. Throughout his journal, he talks about the pride with
which the crew and officers served aboard these vessels. About one man, Brown wrote,
“He was a native of Marblehead, a town renowned in American history for the sturdy
patriotism of its sons.”3 Later, when referring to the entire crew, Brown wrote “I saw
much of these gallant sons of the ocean…”4 Not only did Brown appreciate the economic
and militaristic effects of privateering on the war, he also saw the influence that
privateers brought to the developing American identity.

Brown, along with thousands of other US citizens, would get the opportunity to
participate in the War of 1812 as privateers due to the inadequate size of the United
States Navy. When the United States government declared war in June of 1812, the
United States Navy contained only seventeen vessels. In contrast, the British Royal Navy,
which was the world’s strongest, contained close to 1,000 vessels at the onset of the war.
With many believing the war would be fought primarily at sea, members of Congress
would look to private individuals in order to bolster the American maritime force.5
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The individuals who participated in privateering came from all over the fledgling
country and were previously employed in numerous different occupations. Funding for
the individual vessels came from the ship owners, politicians, merchants, lawyers, and
other wealthy citizens. Those chosen to captain these ships were individuals who
previously served as captains aboard merchant vessels or in the Continental Navy. Other
officers aboard the ships previously served as sailors or individuals who had a specialty
such as the ship doctor. The crew of these vessels were often poor young men who had
little to no experience aboard a ship. These men were previously laborers, farmers, or
young boys who were looking to establish themselves away from their parents. These
individuals came from both rural and urban areas with the hopes of finding employment
aboard privateering vessels.6
Having a ship and a crew did not guarantee that these individuals would be
allowed to participate in the War of 1812. In order to gain permission to act as privateers
during the war, ship owners and captains had to apply for a letter of marquee and reprisal.
These letters, issued by President James Madison, allowed privateers to participate in the
war with one of two objectives. First, privateers could fit their ships with a few guns and
a relatively small crew. These privateers were traders, concerned primarily with the
importation of goods into the country while avoiding the British blockade. While this
group’s primary mission was not to take prizes, they were instructed to do so whenever
the opportunity presented itself. Second, there were privateers whose main mission was
to capture British ships. This style of privateering required ships to have more guns and
more men in order to seize prizes encountered while at sea. While doing so, these
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6
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privateers also imported goods into the country. While the government saw these two
groups as having separate purposes, they often severed the same function. Because of
this, the effects of both groups are presented together in this thesis. 7
Though the United States government only expected privateers to disrupt the
British shipping industry during the War of 1812, this private maritime force contributed
much more during the war effort. During the war, American privateers also provided
militaristic and economic support, while their actions became revered as patriotic among
themselves as well by others within the nation. These effects can all be seen with the
discussion of Benjamin Brown and his involvement in privateering. Brown, like many
other privateers, entered the war concerned with the captures and economic benefit the
enterprise could bring. However, as the war progressed, Brown continued to seek the
economic benefits while also realizing that a sense of pride in the nation was becoming
more prevalent among the crew and himself.

The War of 1812 has been a popular topic among historians, with works first
appearing on the topic not long after the official end of the war. Historians from the
United States, Canada, and Britain have all contributed to the historiography on the
subject. With this, almost every aspect of the war has been covered through numerous
approaches to discussing the events and impacts of the war. One of the most popular
ways of approaching the war can be seen with Reginald Horseman’s The War of 1812,
Donald Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, and J.C.A. Stagg’s The War of
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1812: Conflict for a Continent. These monographs have become some of the most
influential on the War of 1812, providing a general overview of almost every aspect of
the war. Despite their attempts to cover every aspect of the war, privateering is only
briefly mentioned by Hickey and Horseman, while Stagg omits this group entirely.
Additionally, several historians have approached the war by looking at the
militaristic actions of the United States and the British at sea. Stephen Budiansky’s
Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812–1815, Brian
Arthur’s How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy’s Blockade of the United
States, 1812-1815, and Kevin McCranie’s Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies
at Sea in the War of 1812. Despite their focus on the maritime activities of the war, each
of these historians either ignore the impacts of privateering or they downplay the role
privateers played on the war effort. In both the Budiansky and McCranie monographs,
privateers barely receive a mention outside of the fact that they were involved in the war.
Arthur, on the other hand, views privateers as being ineffective once the British blockade
is established. However, in Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the
United States, 1812-1815, Wade Dudley counteracts Arthur’s argument by demonstrating
the ways privateers and the American Navy were able to effectively counteract the
British blockade.
The War of 1812 has also been addressed in terms of social history. In 1812: War
and the Passions of Patriotism, Nicole Eustace looks at the ways in which literature and
art were used to help create a sense of patriotism among American citizens. Despite this,
Eustace does not discuss they ways in which privateers were mentioned in this attempt to
raise patriotic sentiment Additionally, historians such as Donald Hickey has gone as far
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as saying that, “Profit, not patriotism, was their motivation.”8 While profit was the major
motivator for individuals to get involved in privateering, my research demonstrates that
patriotic sentiment rose among privateers as the war progressed.
Additionally, numerous historians have looked at the economic aspect of the War
of 1812. In addition to the coverage the topic has received in works by Hickey, Stagg,
and Horseman, the economics of the war have also been covered in Kenneth Ross’
dissertation Socio-Economic Effects of the War of 1812 Kassandra Radomski’s Mr.
Madison’s War: Causes and Effects of the War of 1812. However, these works only
describe the financial issues leading up to the war and the ways in which the United
States borrowed money to fund the war. My research however expands on the current
historiography to demonstrate the ways in which privateers were able to contribute to the
U.S. economic situation.
While privateering is only briefly mentioned in most of the historiography on the
War of 1812, a few works have been published focusing solely on this private maritime
force. The most recent work to come out on privateering is Faye M. Kert’s Privateering:
Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812. Despite the title’s hint at patriotism playing a
role, Kert ultimately focuses on the ways in which privateers were able to affect the
shipping industry. In doing so, Kert dismisses the privateers as having any real impact on
the war effort outside of driving up insurance prices. However, not all monographs on
privateers have worked to diminish the role of privateers. Edgar Stanton Maclay’s A
History of American Privateers, celebrates privateers and their militaristic contribution to
the war. While, Jerome R. Garitee’s The Republic’s Private Navy: The American
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Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore During the War of 1812, which looks at
the economics of privateering as it applied to Baltimore. While these works look at some
of the effects of privateering on the War of 1812, none describe all of the contributions
privateers had on the American war effort. However, this thesis looks to expand on those
effects discussed by other historians, while also demonstrating that patriotism did play a
role on the decisions privateers made during the War of 1812.

The first chapter of this thesis looks at the ways in which privateers contributed to
the American military effort. Within this chapter there is a discussion of why the U.S.
government turned to privateers and the advantages this private maritime force had
entering the War of 1812. Additionally, this chapter also looks at the ways in which
privateers affected the British shipping industry, the British Royal Navy, and the ways in
which British citizens viewed the war effort. Chapter two shifts focus to the economic
effects of privateering. This chapter focuses on how privateers contributed to the federal
and local economies in the United States, while simultaneously negatively effecting the
British economy. The final chapter looks at the social effects of privateering, paying
attention to the ways in which patriotism is mentioned during the war. With this, the
chapter looks at patriotism as it is mentioned by the privateers themselves, through songs,
and through newspapers. Finally, the epilogue looks at the Treaty of Ghent, what
privateers chose to do following peace, and the Declaration of Paris which ended the
practice of privateering.

8
Expanding the Navy: Privateers and the War Effort

The declaration of war in June of 1812 brought the United States more questions
than it did answers. There were looming fears about fighting and financing the war, but
there were also high hopes for the benefits privateers could bring to the war efforts.
House of Representatives member Peter B. Porter, a Democratic-Republican from New
York, expressed his hopes when he asserted during an address to Congress that hundreds
of privateers would be willing to assist in the war effort within months of the declaration
of war. Porter went on to say that privateers could, “…harass and destroy the vast and
profitable commerce of Great Britain.”9 As Porter hoped with this statement, privateers
did play a role in disrupting the British shipping industry, but their role was ultimately
much larger and they provided more services for the war effort than the government had
initially hoped. In addition to capturing British merchant vessels, privateers also captured
British Royal Navy ships and packets, weakened the blockade, and affected the outlook
of the war for British citizens.
The government’s hopes for the usefulness of privateers led President James
Madison to issue letter of Marque and reprisal soon after the declaration of war. After
receiving letters of Marque, ships were legally permitted to set sail in hopes of capturing
British merchant vessels. Madison included within the letters instructions describing what
private vessels were permitted to do during the war effort. In the Prince de Neufchatel’s
letter, Madison wrote:
BE IT KNOWN, That in pursuance of an act of congress, passed on the 26th day
of June one thousand eight hundred and twelve, I have Commissioned, and by
these presents do commission, the private armed Brig called the Prince Neufchatel
9
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of the burden of three hundred & Nineteen tons, or thereabouts, owned by John
Ordronaux & Peter E. Trevall of the City & State of New York and Joseph Beylle
of Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania Mounting eighteen carriage guns, and
navigated by one hundred & twenty nine men, hereby authorizing Nicholas Millin
captain, and William Stetson lieutenant of the said Brig and the other officers and
crew thereof, to subdue, seize, and take any armed or unarmed British vessel,
public or private, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the
United States, or elsewhere on the high seas, or within the waters of the British
dominions, and such captured vessel, with her apparel, guns, and appurtenances,
and the goods or effects which shall be found on board the same, together with all
the British persons and others who shall be found acting on board, to bring within
some port of the United States; and also to retake any vessel, goods, and effects of
the people of the United States, which may have been captured by any British
armed vessel, in order that proceedings may be had concerning such capture or
recapture in due form of law, and as to right and justice shall appertain. The said
Nicholas Millin is further authorized to detain, seize, and take all vessels and
effects, to whomsoever belonging, which shall be liable thereto according to the
law of nations and the rights of the United States as a power at war, and to bring
the same within some port of the United States, in order that due proceedings may
be had thereon. This commission to continue in force during the pleasure of the
president of the United States for the time being.10
Madison used the instructions to outline the laws of war privateers were expected to
follow. Notably, Madison stressed the importance of respecting the rights of neutral
powers. British failure to respect neutral powers was a major contributing factor leading
up to the war, and he wanted to ensure that United States forces did not further
exacerbate tensions. Madison also included instructions on how to treat captured British
sailors. He instructed to treat captured sailors with, “justice and humanity, which
characterizes the nation of which you are a member.”11 Finally, Madison’s instructions
ordered that all captured vessels be brought to a prize court in the United States. The
letters warned that if the instructions were not followed, the captain and crew of the
vessel could be tried in a military court. Madison’s instructions were able to successfully
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shape the actions of some privateers. Yet, despite potentially severe consequences, his
rules were not always followed.12
For example, privateers were supposed to send their captures into port to be judged by
prize courts, but privateers did not always comply. In fact, privateers became less likely
to send their captures to port as the war went on because privateers feared that the British
Royal Navy would recapture the vessel before it reached port. As a result, privateers
commonly removed sailors and cargo from captured ships and then burned enemy
vessels. Captured sailors were later turned over to the United States government for a fee,
and cargo was sent to prize courts to have its value determined.13
Regardless of whether a privateer ship ultimately followed Madison’s instruction
or not, all privateers had the same goal after receiving their letters of marque and
instructions from President James Madison. They set sail in hopes of making as many
captures as possible. Most often, privateers focused on sailing to regions where the
British conducted most of their trade. As a result, the coasts of British Canada, Africa,
England, and the Caribbean islands saw the majority of privateering action throughout
the war. Each of these locations provided some opportunity for capture, but the English
Channel and the area around the Caribbean islands ultimately provided the best chance to
make captures because American privateers were able to sail faster and maneuver more
smoothly through relatively confined areas.14
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From the beginning of the war, American privateers were at an advantage because
their ships were faster and more maneuverable than British ships, allowing them to more
easily make and avoid capture. Prior to the beginning of the War of 1812, American
shipwrights began to change the design of their ships from the designs used by their
European counterparts. The biggest design differences were within the hulls and masts of
the ships. 15 Whereas the front of European ships was typically rounded, the front of
newly designed American ships was sharp, allowing boats to cut through water better.
The new, American design also changed the width of ships. While British vessels of the
period were wider and prioritized carrying capacity over speed, American ships were
built to be narrower and faster. Together, the changes to the ship body allowed American
privateers to sail at much greater speeds. Meanwhile, changes to the mast allowed
American privateers greater maneuverability. 16
Masts are the tall upright posts on ships that carry the sails. During the War of
1812, most of the ship styles used by the British contained, at most, one or two masts,
while American privateers typically used ships that had two or more masts. With more
sails, privateers were able to move better with less wind. The change made by American
shipwrights prior to the war allowed privateers a number of advantages when going up
against British ships of similar size.17

In addition to the advantages from improved ship design, American privateers
also implemented a number of tactics to increase their chances of making captures. One
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method utilized by both sides during the war was flying false colors. Ships flying false
colors flew a flag of either a neutral country or one of the countries they were at war with
in order to approach an enemy vessel. Once they were in position, they fired a warning
shot over the enemy ship, while raising the flag of their country. This tactic allowed
many privateers to make captures without a battle from the merchant vessel.18
Together, the combination of better ships and the tactics employed allowed
American privateers to fulfil the intent of the United States government and negatively
impact the British shipping industry. Throughout the war, American privateers were
responsible for the capture of 1,509 British Merchant vessels.19 A representative of
Lloyd’s List presented a report to parliament in December 1814 which showed that the
British had already lost 1,175 vessels as of October 1814. The representative later gave a
chart (See Table 1) to parliament showing the most devastating portions of the war for
the British shipping industry.20
Table 1. Average number of British Merchant vessel captures by American privateers, as
reported by Lloyd’s List.
Date
Average Vessels Captured (per month)
August 1812 through September 1812
100
October 1812 through March 1814
20
April 1814 through October 1814
50
November 1814 through February 1815
83
The first three rows demonstrate the numbers presented to parliament by the Lloyd’s List representative.
The last row comes from subtracting the number of vessels reported from this presentation from the total
number of captures found within Lloyd’s List from the beginning of the war to the end of the war.
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As Table 1 demonstrates, privateers were highly effective during the first couple
months of the war. The success was partially due to the fact that the British government
did not declare war on America until September 1812. As a result, American privateers
were able to take merchant vessels without interreference from the British Royal Navy.
The Dolphin, a privateer ship out of Salem, Massachusetts, was able to capture fifteen
British merchant vessels during the first two months of the war alone. One of its early
captures, the Mary from Bristol, England, proved to be exceptionally helpful as it was
carrying weapons and ammunition which were later used by the Dolphin’s crew.21
The Rossie, an American privateering vessel out of Baltimore, also encountered early
success. On a cruise from late August to late September, the Rossie was able to capture
12 British ships with a total value of $1,280,000. After the money was divided among
the crew, ship owners, and United States government, several of the crew members
decided to retire with their new fortunes. All in all, the early months of the war proved to
be the most fruitful for privateers, and around 25% of all captures occurred during the
first four months of the war.22
After the first two months of the war, Britain’s declaration of war led to a drastic
decline in captures for American Privateers. After the war declaration, American
privateering efforts had to overcome obstacles imposed by the British Royal Navy. Most
notably, the British Royal Navy imposed a blockade along the east coast of the United
States. The blockade made it more difficult, though not impossible, for privateers to get
to the regions where they made their most captures. In addition to the blockade, the
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British also began to impose a compulsory convoy system, which required all merchant
vessels to be escorted by the British Royal Navy to and from popular trading
destinations.23
Despite British obstacles, privateers found some success. According to an 1814
report, British merchants voiced their frustration with privateering action and the inability
of the British Royal Navy to prevent further captures during a merchant meeting in
Glasgow. A portion of the meeting was published in the British newspaper Examiner. In
their article, the newspaper reported:
…the number of American Privateers with which our channels have been
infested, the audacity with which they approached our coasts, and the success
with which their enterprize has been attended—have proved injurious to our
commerce, humbling to our pride, and discreditable to the director of the naval
power of the British Nation, whose flag, till of late, waved over every sea, and
triumphed over every rival. That there is reason to believe, in the short space of
less than twenty-four months, above eight hundred vessels have been captured by
a power, whose maritime strength, we have hitherto impolitically held in
contempt. That, at a time when we are at peace with the rest of the world, when
the maintenance of our marine costs so large a sum to the country, when the
mercantile and shipping interests pay a tax for protection, under the form of
Convoy Duty, and when in the plentitude of our power, we have declared the
whole American coast under Blockade; it is equally distressing and mortifying,
that our ships cannot with safety traverse our own channels, that insurance cannot
be effected by at excessive premium, and that a horde of American cruisers
should be allowed, unheeded, unresisted, unmolested, to take, burn, or sink our
own vessels, in our own inlets, and almost in sight of our own harbours.24
The article made clear that while the British Royal Navy was able to reduce the effects of
privateers, it was not able to prevent privateers from continuing to impact the British
shipping industry.

23
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The number of captures dropped to roughly twenty captures per month for the vast
majority of the remainder of the war, but the privateers saw a brief increase in monthly
captures following a peace in the Napoleonic Wars. The peace in Europe led many
merchant vessels to believe they no longer needed to abide by a convoy system to
conduct trade. The resulting failure to utilize the protection offered by the British Royal
Navy allowed privateers to increase captures. In the first seven months following the
peace, privateers increased their captures to fifty per month. The number increased again
to eighty-three captures per month during the final four months of the war.25
The Prince de Neufchatel from New York had great success following the peace
in Europe.26 Beginning in April 1814, and continuing for the following ten months, the
Prince de Neufchatel, made all thirty-four of its captures. The majority of the ship’s
captures occurred in the English and Irish Channels, which furthered the frustrations
British merchants had voiced. In total, the Prince de Neufchatel was estimated to deal
well over one million dollars worth of damages to the British shipping industry in the
later part of the war. Despite the significant level of damages this one privateering ship
was able to cause, it was only a small part of the overarching privateering effort to disrupt
British trading.27
By the end of the war, American privateers had captured 1,509 British merchant
vessels or around 7% of the Britain’s merchant fleet.

While 7% was only a small

percentage of the overall merchant maritime fleet, the effects were undoubtably felt
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during the war effort, as demonstrated by the Glasgow merchant meeting where a large
portion of the meeting revolved around the loss of the vessels. Although a significant
portion of the ships captured by privateers were merchant vessels, merchant ships were
not the only significant captures made by private maritime forces during the war effort.28

In addition to disrupting the British shipping industry, privateers also engaged
with British Royal Navy vessels. Despite the fact that the United States government did
not expect privateers to fight the British Royal Navy, the battles often occurred out of
necessity. The first major encounter occurred in August 1813 when the privateering ship
Decatur fought the HMS Dominica. According to the Decatur’s logbook, the battle was
bloody and lasted for an hour. In the end, the Decatur was victorious and claimed the
HMS Dominica as its prize.29
After returning to port, the captain of the Decatur turned the British Royal Navy
vessel over to John Dent, the commanding naval officer of Charleston. Dent then wrote to
the Secretary of the Navy, William Jones, to inform him of the privateers’
accomplishment. In his letter, Dent wrote:
I have the honor to inform you that the privateer schooner Decatur, of this port,
arriver here yesterday with H.B.M. schooner Dominica, her prize. She was
captured on the 15th inst. After a most gallant and desperate action of one hour,
and carried by boarding, having all her officers killed or wounded except one
midshipman. The Dominica mounts 15 guns, one a 32-pounder on a pivot, and
had a complement of 83 men at the commencement of the action, sixty of whom
were killed or wounded. She was one of the best equipped and manned vessels of
her class I have seen. The Decatur mounts seven guns and had a complement of
103 men at the commencement of the action, nineteen of whom were killed and
wounded.30
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Dent’s letter showed the importance of the Decatur’s capture to the American maritime
war effort.
Roughly eight months after the capture of the HMS Dominica, American
privateers captured another British Royal Navy vessel. In April 1814, the privateering
vessel Perry encountered the HMS Ballahou while sailing off the English coast. The
battle between the ships lasted around one hour and caused little damage to either ship. In
an attempt to justify the capture by American privateers, a British lawyer, William James,
described the vessel as one of the smallest vessels in the navy’s fleet.31
A third capture was made by the privateering vessel Syren just four months later.
The Syren was sailing the English Channel in August 1814 when it encountered the HMS
Landrail. The ships spent an hour and ten minutes firing canons at one another and
another forty minutes battling with muskets. Before surrender, the Landrail threw several
messages over-board, including instructions for several other British Royal Navy vessels.
By the end of the battle, seven men aboard the HMS Landrail were injured, fifteen men
on the Syren were injured, and three members of the Syren’s crew were killed.32
Finally, the last privateering capture of a British Royal Navy ship occurred in
February 1815. While sailing in the Caribbean, the Chasseur mistook the HMS St.
Lawrence and began to chase the ship. Though the men aboard the Chasseur were not
prepared to engage a British Royal Navy vessel, the battle only lasted for fifteen minutes.
Four days after the battle Captain Thomas Boyle of the Chasseur wrote to the owner of
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the ship to inform him of the capture. Boyle began his letter by writing, “I have the honor
to inform you…of the capture of the Britannic majesty’s schooner St. Lawrence.”33 Of
the thirty-nine captures Boyle made during the war, this was the only letter he wrote to
the ship’s owner in regard to a single capture. By writing the letter, Boyle demonstrated
the level of importance a British Royal Navy capture had for privateers and the nation.34
While the four ships captured by American privateers were only a small portion of the
British Royal Navy’s roughly 1,000 vessels, the captures proved beneficial to the war
effort in multiple ways. First, the captures were valuable assistance to the United States
Navy. Throughout the war, U.S. forces captured a total of only nineteen British Royal
Navy Vessels; thus, the four captures made by privateers accounted for roughly 21% of
all captures.35 Second, the captures helped shape public opinion of the war in both the
United States and England. In the United States, the captures were used by newspapers,
poets, and song writers in an attempt to garner support for the war effort. On the other
hand, English citizens used the captures to question Britain’s involvement in the war and
the overall strength of the British military.

In addition to the capture of British merchant vessels and British Royal Navy
Ships, during the War of 1812 American privateers captured twenty-eight British packets.
Packets were responsible for delivering mail throughout the British empire during the
war. When a packet was captured, or capture was feared, the mail was often thrown
overboard to prevent privateers from turning the mail over to the government. The ships
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were also responsible for carrying spices and precious metals from British controlled
territories back to England. As a result, when the privateering vessel Governor Tompkins
captured the packet Mary-Ann in May 1813, the crew found $50,000 worth of gold and
bullion along with the mail.36
The twenty-eight captured packets were not only economically beneficial to
privateers, but they also helped the United States to further its war efforts. Capturing
packets often disrupted communication between war officials because mails was the
major source of communication during the war. The disruption of communication
became so severe that English politician Alexander Baring said to parliament, “It was not
into the chops of the Channel alone that the Americans had penetrated, they had got into
the Irish sea, and endangered the communication between Liverpool and Bristol and
Ireland. Such a circumstance was hardly within the memory of man, that with such a
naval force as ours, the Admiralty were not able to guard the narrow outlets of the Irish
Sea.”37 The capture of packets allowed privateers to disrupt English communications,
making it difficult for the British to effectively plan land and maritime war activities.

Several privateering captains and their crews also helped the war effort by affecting the
British Royal Navy blockade. One of the earliest examples of this occurred in 1813, when
several privateering vessels joined the United States Navy to monitor actions of British
ships. Beginning in the spring of 1813, the British Royal Navy established a blockade of
the Chesapeake Bay that all but prevented ships from entering or leaving the bay. At this
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point in the war, the United States Navy did not possess any vessels with the appropriate
size and maneuverability to effectively challenge the British Royal Navy in the confines
of the Chesapeake Bay. As a result, the commanding officer of the Chesapeake Bay naval
force, Captain Charles Gordon, need to find a way to effectively prevent the British from
attacking costal settlements. Working with the Baltimore insurance agents, Gordon came
up with a plan to have privateers who were docked in Baltimore assist in the defense of
the bay. After the plan was developed, Gordon appealed to Secretary of the Navy,
William Jones, to issue commissions in the United States Navy for the captains of the
privateering ships chosen. The Navy ultimately agreed and assigned privateering captains
the rank of Sailing Master, which was seen as a rank just below that of an officer in the
Navy. Gordon reached out to the captains of the Wasp, Revenge, Patapsco, and Comet to
assist in the defense of the bay.38
On April 15, 1813, all four privateering vessels accepted their commission into the Navy.
While the privateers served in the Navy, Gordon noted their duties in letters to Secretary
Jones. In one letter to Jones, Gordon noted that the Comet and Revenge had been
assigned to move buoys in the bay throughout the month of May. In July, the Comet and
Revenge were reassigned to the mouth of the bay to monitor the movements of British
Royal Navy vessels. Nearly a month later, the Department of the Navy ended the
privateer contracts. Although the privateers did not ultimately fight on behalf of the
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Navy, they carried out a number of functions to help defend the bay against further
attacks by the British.39
The British Royal Navy’s blockade successfully prevented privateering movement for a
short period, but the blockade was not always effective. Throughout the war effort,
privateers were able to navigate around, or through, the blockade, by using the speed and
maneuverability of their ships. Continued success is evident my looking at the table on
page six. Although the number of captures declined, privateer effectiveness remained.
Privateer ability to get around the blockade was important because it allowed privateers
to make captures and bring in goods at a time when merchant vessels had difficulty
getting in and out of U.S. harbors.40
In addition to getting around the blockade, privateers also weakened the blockade by
making Parliament impose the convoy system. The convoy system required British Royal
Navy vessels to leave the blockade to focus on transporting merchant vessels to and from
trade destinations. Even when the compulsory convoy system was in place, privateers
were still able to capture ships which were supposedly guarded by naval vessels. The
tactics privateers used to accomplish these captures was best described by G.J. Marcus in
the Age of Nelson, when he wrote the following:
They carried a large spread of canvas, particularly for use in light airs. With their
large blocks and thinner ropes they did not present so smart an appearance as the
British, but undoubtedly they were easier to work. They were faster and more
skillfully maneuvered than any other vessels of their class. They could generally
overhaul any merchantman and elude any man-of-war. With their light
construction and immense spread of canvas they could wear or take and dart away
under a frigate’s gun long before their heavy opponent could come about. They
39
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were well adapted to attack either merchantman or running ship. By night they
could run right into the midst of a convoy and cut out some unlucky
merchantman; by day they could pounce on laggards and stragglers.41
Marcus explained how British Royal Naval vessels had difficulty stopping privateers
from attacking convoys. Throughout the war, privateers were able to get around British
naval vessels, whether they were part of the blockade or leading a convoy, because of
their speed and maneuverability. As a result, privateers continued to have an effect on the
war effort, despite British attempts to stop them.42

American privateers were able to contribute to the war effort through their capture
of merchant vessels, British Royal Navy ships, and British packets. Their actions even
helped lead British citizens to call for the end of the war. At the beginning of the war, the
British Royal Navy was believed to be the strongest in the world. As the war progressed,
British citizens began to question this belief as American privateers and the United States
Navy began capturing British vessels. Even as early as March 20, 1813 an edition of The
London Times published the following:
…This is an occurrence that calls for serious reflection-- this, and the fact stated
in our paper of yesterday, that Lloyd’s List contains notices of upwards of five
hundred British vessels captured, in seven months, by the Americans. Five
Hundred merchantmen and three frigates!43 Can these statements be true; and can
the English people hear them unmoved? Any one who had predicted such a result
of an American war this time last year, would have been treated as a madman or a
traitor. He would have been told. If his opponents had condescended to argue with
him, that long ere seven months had elapsed, the American flag would be swept
from the seas, the contemptible navy of the U.S. annihilated, and their maritime
arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. Yet down to this moment, not a single
41
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American frigate has struck her flag. They insult and laugh at our want of
enterprize and vigour. They leave their ports when they please, and return to them
when it suits their convenience; they traverse the Atlantic; they beset the West
India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the Channel; they parade along
the coast of South America; nothing engages them but to yield them triumph. The
friends of Ministers allow, that it ‘does seem extraordinary’ that the Americans
should have such ‘good fortune.’ We say that it is still more extraordinary that
strict enquiry has not yet been made into the causes to which that good fortune is
owing. We say that such enquiry must terminate in overwhelming the managers
of the war with the utmost disgrace. We may be accused of feeling too strongly on
such a subject; but at least we are sure that it is not a party feeling that we indulge.
It is an earnest and sincere feeling for the honour and interest of our country. Let
it be seriously considered, that a very few years of such a warfare would
annihilate our mercantile marine, and render our vaunted navy the laughing-stock
of the universe. Let it be seriously considered, that the extraordinary losses have
befallen us, not in a contest with a superior or equal maritime enemy, but with one
whom, to name as a naval power, would a short while since, have been deemed
absurd.44
By publishing this piece, the editors of The London Times made clear that American
privateers were having a significant effect on the war effort. In particular, American
privateers were led British citizens to question the strength of the British Royal Navy.
Moreover, the article demonstrated how large of an impact privateering captures had on
the British shipping industry. The initial stages of a call for the end of the war can be seen
with the discussion of what could occur if the war were to continue.
One of the major factors leading to the end of the war was the opposition British
leaders faced at the hands of their citizens. Many British citizens did not believe in going
to war with the United States in the first place. Those who initially supported the war
began to question the government’s decisions, believing that losses from the war had
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become too great. Privateers did not contribute to all of the issues that fostered negative
sentiment, but they did play a significant role in British losses throughout the war.45
Government leaders knew that a private maritime force aided military actions during war,
but they did not anticipate the number of positive contributions privateers ultimately
made during the War of 1812. In addition to their designated duty of disrupting British
trade, privateers also captured British Royal Navy vessels and packets, affected the
blockade, and were part of the reason British citizens began to call for an end to the war.
Given the small size of the United States Navy during the War of 1812, the contributions
of privateering likely prevented the United States from receiving further damage from the
British.
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On the Verge of Collapse: The Privateering Role in Financing the War of 1812

Insufficient funding was a recurring problem throughout the War of 1812. In March of
1813, Secretary of Treasury, Albert Gallatin, wrote to President James Madison, “We
have hardly enough money to last till the end of the month.”46 While the treasury
ultimately found the funding to make it through the end of the month, financial
conditions in the United States remained strained. In late 1814, Secretary of State James
Monroe expressed to former president Thomas Jefferson, “Our finances are in a
deplorable state.”47 Prior to the war’s onset, the Republican party failed to appropriately
plan and raise funds for the war. As the war went on, both Federalists and Republicans
expressed concern over the financial state of the Union. It was clear to both parties that
the nation was not adequately prepared to fund an expensive war. Luckily, the burden
was lessened by privateers. American private maritime forces were able to provide
significant funds for not only themselves but also for merchants, port cities, and the
federal government while also negatively affecting the British economy.
The financial dilemma, which became a major point of contention for political
leaders during the War of 1812, can be linked back to Jeffersonian Republican ideals.
Policies that favored limited government, an emphasis on individual freedoms, and
economic sanctions over military intervention in foreign relations were established during
Thomas Jefferson’s presidency and carried over into President James Madison’s time in
office. Both leaders believed in a small government that did not provide a large military
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or tax beyond necessity. Both Jefferson and Madison also saw the Bank of the United
States as an unnecessary facet of the government, which led to the Bank losing its charter
just before the onset of the war. The culmination of Jefferson and Madison’s ideal
contributed to a nation that was both financially and militarily unprepared for war.48
The issue of impressment was one of the biggest issues leading into the war and
became a point of hostility between the United States and Britain beginning in 1803.
British impressment policy enraged both President Thomas Jefferson and his Secretary of
State James Madison, but the leaders decided to attempt to negotiate for the recognition
of neutral shipping with Great Britain and to focus on creating a friendly relationship
with the nation. In March of 1805, James Madison explained to James Monroe that the
goal was to avoid “illiberal or hostile sentiments toward Great Britain,” and to instead
“…cherish friendly relations with Great Britain.”49
Jefferson and Madison utilized a cordial approach in dealing with British
impressment of American seamen until 1807 when the British warship HMS Leopold
attacked the American Navy vessel USS Constitution. Following the attack, the United
States issued the Embargo Act of 1807 in order to prevent United States merchant vessels
from setting sail for any foreign port. Jefferson and Madison believed the Embargo Act
would be an effective response because they saw the United States as the “principal
remaining market for her manufactures.”50 Nevertheless, the United States overestimated
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its economic importance, which ultimately contributed to the devastated economy
entering into the War of 1812. In fact, the effects of the embargo cut the nations revenue
from import tariffs nearly in half from 1908 to 1809. Meanwhile, the nation’s
expenditures continued to rise. As a result, the financial surplus the United States had
accrued during its time of peace nearly disappeared before the embargo was lifted in
1809.51
In addition to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, similar
sanctions passed by Great Britain during the period also negatively impacted the
economic status of the United States. During both the Napoleonic Wars and the War of
1812, the Privy Council of the United Kingdom passed Orders in Council that restricted
neutral trade and authorized a blockade of Napoleonic France.52 The majority of the
orders were intended to negatively impact the economy of France, but the orders passed
in 1807 and 1809 were especially harmful to the American economy. The 1807 and 1809
orders prevented British merchants from trading with the United States.53 As a result,
United States was unable to receive duties from any goods, which further decreased the
money available for the impending war.54
Even in the face of decreased revenue, Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin,
believed that the United States would still be able to wage a war without excessive
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taxation on the American citizens. He believed that the nation could finance the war
through revenue from duties on tariffs, land sales, and the receiving of war loans. Gallatin
also maintained that the United States would be able to quickly pay off any loans
received during the war once the nation returned to peace. Nevertheless, Gallatin’s plan
to fund the war placed a large emphasis on the importance of the Bank of the United
States and assumed that the Bank would be available throughout the war effort.55
The Bank of the United States was created in 1791 under the direction of
Alexander Hamilton, the First Secretary of the Treasury. Both Hamilton and George
Washington considered the Bank necessary to help build the credit of the United States
government. While some government leaders agreed with Hamilton and Washington’s
perceived need, others believed that the Bank would give the federal government too
much power. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and several other southern members of
Congress led the charge against the Bank. When he responded to the proposed Bank in
1791, Madison acknowledged the potential benefits of the bank. He admitted that he
believed the Bank would increase the efficiency of the financial system and encourage
effective government operations. Nevertheless, Madison was largely opposed to the
creation of the bank. He did not believe in replacing specie with paper money, and he
feared that the Bank had the potential to create a financial panic. Moreover, Madison
disagreed with the concept of a centrally located government bank; instead, he believed
that “several banks properly distributed” better suited the nation’s need.56 Overall,
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Madison believed the Bank of the United States to be convenient but unnecessary.
Madison was ultimately unable to prevent the First Bank of the United States from being
founded, but he had more say in the matter during his first term as President of the United
States.57
When the Bank of the United States was founded, it received a charter that lasted for
twenty years, allowing the bank to come up for review in 1811, just prior to the outbreak
of the War of 1812. During its review, the bank received strong support from both
Federalists and some Republicans, including Albert Gallatin. On the other hand, some
other Republican leaders, such as Henry Clay, were strongly opposed to the idea of
issuing a new charter for the bank. During the congressional debates on the bank charter,
President James Madison remained relatively silent, but former presidents Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams both publicly addressed their distrust of the bank. The issue of
whether or not the bank should be chartered was split among Congress throughout the
voting process. The strongest voice in support of a new bank charter was Secretary of the
Treasury Gallatin, who issued several reports beginning in 1809 to voice his support for
the institution. In his reports, Gallatin focused on the condition and operations of the bank
and portrayed the bank as a convenient tool for the federal government.58
In contrast, Henry Clay was the strongest voice in opposition to the bank. In a speech
made to Congress in 1811, Clay argued against the Bank and went as far as to insinuate
that the bank had not been helpful in solving any of the issues that faced the United States
government.59 When the United States Senate ultimately voted on the future of the Bank
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on February 20, 1811, seventeen votes were cast in favor of renewing the charter and
seventeen votes were cast in opposition. Vice President DeWitt Clinton broke the tied
and decided to effectively end the Bank of the United States. Although the decision was
manageable while at peace, it made funding the War of 1812 a difficult task for President
James Madison and his cabinet.60
With the Bank of the United States gone and the declaration of war in June of 1812,
Albert Gallatin was forced to turn to other measures to fund the war effort. One measure
employed by Gallatin was the sale of $5 million worth of treasury notes each year of the
war.61 The notes were able to offer some financial assistance, but alone, they were not
enough to finance the rising costs faced by the nation. As a result, Gallatin had to seek
out loans from state banks as a means of funding the war. Throughout the war, Gallatin
turned to the Union and Massachusetts banks of Massachusetts, the Manhattan Co. and
Mechanics Bank of New York, the Bank of Pennsylvania and the Farmers and Mechanics
Bank of Pennsylvania, the Bank of Baltimore and Commercial and Famers Bank of
Maryland, the Bank of Virginia, the State Bank of South Carolina, and the Bank of
Louisiana.62 Relying on state banks for federal funding was problematic for several
reasons. First, state banks were not required to redeem treasury notes, which led to an
inadequate and inconsistent supply of income during the war effort. Second, state banks
were not required to hold a certain amount of specie, which resulted in economic panics
and financial crisis leading to the suspension of specie redemption. As a whole, state
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banks were an unreliable source of money, even when paired with the income received
through the sale of treasury notes and land and from import duties.63
To make matters worse for the federal government, the merchants who the government
relied upon for import duties became less active during the course of the war. When the
British Royal Navy imposed its blockade, many merchants were unwilling to risk capture
and either impressment or imprisonment at the hand of the British. Moreover, insurance
rates on cargo increased drastically during the war effort, making the transportation of
goods too expensive for many merchants. In total, the number of merchants who were
active at the end of the war was only around ten percent of the number who were active
prior to the outbreak of the war.64
Albert Gallatin had the foresight to plan for the decrease in merchant vessels. In an 1812
report to Congress, Gallatin advised Congress not to expect more than $2.5 million a year
from import duties during the war.65 His projections were ultimately too high, and import
duties never dropped so low. Instead, the federal government saw minimal difference in
import duties due to privateers. Captures by private maritime forces provided a
significant amount of money throughout the war effort.
Although precise financial gain from privateers is difficult to determine,
newspapers of the period often published individual captures and detailed the goods
acquired and their value. By looking at the reported value and using the common duty
percentages during the period, the amount of money the United States government made
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from certain captures can be estimated. For example, Thomas Boyle’s Comet captured
the British merchant ship John out of Liverpool in 1812 on a voyage from South America
to Liverpool. The John’s hull contained cotton, rum, and coffee and was deemed to hold
a value of $150,000 before it was put up for auction by the prize court. During the first
year of the war, the duty rate on captured cargo ranged from 35% to 50%, depending on
the location of the port and the terms of the letter of marquee issued to the privateer. Even
using the lower number from this range, the federal government received at least $52,500
from this one capture. During the first four months of the war, when more than 25% of all
privateering captures occurred, the United States government’s finances benefited greatly
from its relationship with privateers.66
Due to the supplemental effect privateering actions had on the declining merchant
fleet, Congress granted financial reprieve to privateers by reducing the duties they were
required to pay on captured goods. In August of 1813, Congress voted to reduce the rate
at which privateer captures were taxed by one third. The reduction brought duty rates for
captures to between 23% and 33% of the cargo’s value. By issuing the act, Congress did
two things to demonstrate its need for privateers in the war effort. First, Congress
demonstrated the importance of the revenue the government was receiving through
privateers. If privateers had not been bringing in a significant amount of money, the
government would have most likely left the duties on imports at the same level,
especially considering that Congress was tasked with creating additional taxes to make up
for the budget deficit during the war effort. Second, the act was used to encourage more

66

Faye M. Kert, Privateering: Patriots and Profits in the War of 1812 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2015, 2-4; Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy, 184; Timothy S. Good, American
Privateers in the War of 1812: The Vessels and Their Prizes as Recorded in Niles’ Weekly Register,
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc., 2012), 28.

33
private ships to seek letters of marquee. Since privateers were primarily concerned with
making a profit for themselves and their investors, the act was able to encourage
privateers to stay involved in the war effort or to become involved in hopes of higher
profits.67
Even with the new duty rates in place, the United States government continued to
financially benefit from the use of privateers. When Bristol, Rhode Island’s the Yankee
captured the Portuguese ship St. Jose on its voyage from Liverpool to Rio De Janeiro in
July 1814, the ship was transporting dry goods and British manufactured tools. At prize
court, the assessed value of these goods was determined to be $600,000. Utilizing the
new duty rates, the government was paid $138,000 from this capture.68
In total, the monetary value of the goods captured by privateers that were
recorded in the Niles Weekly Register was more than $45.5 million at the wars end. Based
on this number, privateering made the United States, at the very minimum, just shy of
$10.5 million by the wars end. However, due to the fact that the majority of the values for
the captured cargo this number is much lower than the actual economic effects. While
these numbers provide insight into the ways in which privateering provided money for
the federal government, they are unable to provide a full insight into their full effects. To
get a better, yet still incomplete, picture of the methods privateers provided income for
the United States government, these numbers must be looked at in conjunction with the
economic reports presented by the Secretaries of Treasury during the war.69
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Each year, the Secretary of the Treasury offered two reports to Congress on the
financial standing of the United States government. The first report was presented in June
and detailed the expected expenditures from June of one year to June of the next. The
second report came in December and detailed the actual yearly income and expenses of
the federal government.70 In December of 1812, Albert Gallatin presented the first war
time annual report. The report demonstrated the financial difficulties facing the United
States. It showed that the government had received $20 million from duties, loans, and
treasury notes (Table 2).71 However, without loans, income totaled only $10.9 million,
which did not allow the government to fully cover the $11.1 million cost of funding the
Army and Navy for the year. Despite the fact that the $10.9 million of income was much
higher than the $2.5 million that Gallatin had estimated, the deficit still make clear to
Gallatin and Congress that the United States would have to borrow a significant amount
of money to fund the war in the coming years.72
Table 2. United States Government Finances from the Embargo of 1807 through the War
of 1812
Year
Revenue from
Expenses
Loans
Treasury Notes
Duties
1807
$15.8 Million
$12.6 Million
N/A
N/A
1808
$10 Million
$13.8 Million
N/A
N/A
1809
$6.5 Million
$13.8 Million
N/A
N/A
1810
$12.5 Million
$14.1 Million
N/A
N/A
1811
$7.5 Million
$15.8 Million
$10.5 Million
$5 Million
1812
$10.9 Million
$21.5 Million
$4.1 Million
$5 Million
1813
$13.5 Million
$33 Million
$19 Million
$5 Million
1814
$11 Million
$47. 3 Million
$25 Million
$5 Million
70
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This table was created using the yearly economic figures for the United States government as they were
presented by the Secretary of the Treasury to Congress in December of each year. The years represented
demonstrate the effects of the Embargo of 1807, the British Orders of Council, and the War of 1812.

The following year, Albert Gallatin did not present the report to Congress because
he stepped down from the Secretary of Treasury position in April after serving in the role
through the Jefferson presidency and the first term of Madison’s presidency. President
James Madison appointed Secretary of the Navy, William Jones, to serve as acting
Secretary of the Treasury, while also continuing in his role as Secretary of the Navy.
Jones was tasked with presenting the 1813 financial report to Congress in January of
1814. The report showed that the United States had received $37.5 million, with $13.5
million coming from revenue and the other $24 million coming from loans and treasury
notes. Meanwhile, the expenses for the year amounted to a total of $33 million. Jones
concluded his report to Congress by stating that he believed Congress would need to find
an additional $29 million in funding for 1814.73
One month after giving his report, William Jones was relieved of his duty as Secretary of
the Treasury, and President James Madison appointed Senator George Campbell of
Tennessee to the position. Like the two secretaries before him, Campbell found the
position to be overwhelming due to the United States’ inability to afford the war. The
stress led Campbell to step down before the war’s end but not before presenting a report
on the 1814 fiscal year.74 In his report to Congress, Campbell noted that the federal
government had spent a total of $47.2 million dollars in 1814, with $32.7 million going
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towards the military. Meanwhile, the government brought in only $11 million in revenue
and had taken out an additional $34 million in loans and treasury bills.75
According to these three reports, a total of $34.5 million dollars was generated
through duties during the war effort. While the numbers from the Niles’ Weekly Register
indicated that there was only $10.5 million in revenue from privateering captures, the
amount was likely much higher. The amount reported in the Niles’ was likely skewed
because Hezekiah Niles was forced to use incomplete records for his paper. Throughout
the war, Niles attempted to print as much information pertaining to privateering actions
as possible, but records were not always available to him. As a result, the records printed
by Niles only show a fraction of the cargo values captured by American privateers.
In addition, there was a significant decline of merchant vessels during the war effort, so
privateers likely contributed a significant portion of the $34.5 million recorded.
Beginning in 1813, the British Royal Navy blockade of the east coast reduced the number
of merchants involved in foreign trade to roughly 10% of the prewar number. While the
revenue numbers published by the government made no distinction on the duties
collected due to privateering captures and the goods brought in by the merchant vessels
still conducting foreign business, given the drastic decline in merchants, it can be inferred
that privateers were making up a significant portion of the duties collected during the
war. Thus, while the amount of revenue that privateers provided through their captures
cannot be determined, the preceding factors indicate that American privateers had a
significant impact on American finances during the War of 1812.76

American State Papers, 3, Finance, 2: 840. September 26, 1814, “State of Finances.” Accessed from the
Library of Congress American Memory website. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html.
76
American State Papers; Annals of Congress; Good, American Privateers in the War of 1812, 5; Garitee,
The Republic’s Private Navy, 184.
75

37
In addition to providing a significant percentage of the revenue for the American
government, privateers were also able to prevent the nation from experiencing a decrease
in revenue from the time of peace before the war. Privateers were able to bring in more
revenue than merchants were capable of providing before the war. In the three years
leading up to the war, revenue from duties on goods brought into the nation averaged
$8.8 million a year. In comparison, revenue from duties averaged just under $12 million a
year during the way. The ability of privateers to effectively get goods into the nation
decreased the deficit the government would have faced had it only relied on merchants. 77
Furthermore, with total expenditures for the war reaching over $100 million dollars,
privateering offered the United States government a way to supplement the Navy without
incurring any cost. Instead, privateering was funded by individuals, or groups, throughout
the war. These individuals and groups took the economic risk of losing captured cargo or
even ships during the war effort. In total, privateering provided the United States with
more than five hundred additional ships to supplement the seventeen naval vessels
employed by the Navy at the start of the war. The supplementary ships allowed the
federal government to spend less on expanding the Navy, further preventing the war
expenses from expanding.78
In all, privateering actions during the War of 1812 played a significant role in
providing a source of revenue for the United States government. Entering into the war,
Republican economic policies made it difficult for the Secretary of Treasury to find funds
for the war. The decrease in active merchant vessels led to a further decline in
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government revenue. Together, the conditions led many public officials to be fearful
about the economic vitality of the nation. However, privateers were able to help fill the
economic void. Through their captures, privateers prevented the United States
government from seeing large deficits and helped reduce the number of loans needed to
fund the war.

Throughout the war, privateering also helped to play a role in fostering the
development of port cities. During the war, port cities helped privateers get to sea
quickly. In port cities where privateering was prominent, almost all members of the local
economy benefitted from the new, war-developed industry. Some of the economic gain
came from the investments local citizens put into privateering. However, there was also
an increase in jobs, requiring more people to move into the city, and the further
development of local industries. The local effects of privateering led early historians on
the topic to deem any war involving privateers to be a “war of the people.”79 Overall,
sustained economic growth continued throughout the war and lasted for several years
after the declaration of peace.80
Privateering provided a large economic boom for a number of industries and
individuals in port cities. The boom was primarily due to the sheer number of people who
were involved in the process of outfitting, funding, and manning privateer vessels. In
total, it has been estimated that around 10,000 of the roughly 50,000 citizens of Baltimore
were somehow connected to privateering. The groups that profited from the private
enterprise included, shipwrights, candle makers, riggers, sailors, and merchants. With
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such a large number of people investing time and money into the practice, it is easy to see
why privateering was economically beneficial to port cities.81
The group of individuals who saw the biggest economic increase during the War
of 1812, were those who held large investments in port cities. These investors owned the
private ship yards, the vessels that the privateers used during the war, and had stakes in
the local markets where merchandise came into America. Peter Arnold Karthaus was one
investor who benefitted greatly from the war. Karthaus was an American investor living
in Baltimore and was the sole owner of the privateering vessel Kemp. Throughout of the
course of the war, Karthaus’ investment in Kemp brought an estimated profit of
$140,000. In addition to being a ship owner, Karthaus also saw income from privateering
by insuring local ships and performing work in shipyards. Throughout the war, hundreds
of investors along the east coast saw substantial returns on their investment in
privateering. When men, like Karthaus, saw returns on their investments, they continued
to invest in privateering and the industries that supported it.82
The ship building industry experienced an economic boom during the War of
1812. The growth occurred due to the increased need for ships from the US Navy,
merchant marines, and privateers. While the majority of privateering ships were built at
the beginning of the war, privateers called upon ship builders throughout the war in order
to replace the ships that were lost to the British. In addition to the increased need for
ships, the privateering ships built prior to the war had to rely on ship yards to refit their
boats for wartime activity. During this process, alterations were made to the ship’s
structure and weapons were added to the ship’s hull. The overall increased usage of the
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local ship building industries helped local economies in a number of ways. One of the
most prominent effects it had on the economy was the creation of jobs. Throughout the
war, shipyards required an increased number of carpenters to help build ships. Not to
mention, additional carpenters were needed on ships in order to repair any damages that
occurred at sea. The expansion of the ship building industry during the war helped cities
develop economically and allowed cities to prepare themselves for the expansion of the
navy that would come following the end of the war.83
Ship builders were not the only ones drawn to port cities during the war.
Throughout the war, an increased number of people moved to the cities in hopes of
becoming a crew member on a privateering vessel. While the war effort was in full effect,
many of the cities also saw job openings as individuals went off to war. In addition, many
new job opportunities became available as war-specific positions were created. The
growth in population fostered by new jobs led to increased investment in the cities,
meaning more individuals were buying goods, purchasing homes, and spending their
money in local shops.84
Prior to the war, merchants brought goods into port cities. While some of the
goods were sold to local citizens, the rest of the foodstuffs were sold to vendors outside
of the port cities, meaning the money was not being directly invested back into the city.
However, this dynamic began to change with privateers. When a ship and its cargo were
captured and assessed a value by the prize court, the local port city auctioned the goods.
This meant that all of the proceeds from selling the food were invested directly back into
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the port cities themselves. The investment not only stimulated the economy directly but
also provided indirect stimulation with the creation of jobs.85
Baltimore saw the largest growth as a direct effect from the war. The city’s
growth lasted until 1819 and then began to taper. The majority of the growth was due to
the number of privateers that called Baltimore home. The number of privateers in
Baltimore led the shipbuilding industry to boom in the early war years. In addition, the
privateers from Baltimore tried to send their captures back to the city, causing an influx
of goods, and eventually money when the goods were sold at auction.86
Due to the boom in port cities, such as Baltimore, and the creation of prize courts,
many of these locations saw an influx of goods auctioned from captured vessels. This
increase in hard-to-find goods drew individuals from longer distances as the need arose.
One example of this can be seen with sugar – an imported good. Due to the blockade,
sugar was becoming increasingly hard to import, leading to a drastic increase in price.
While merchants were not able to provide as much sugar, privateers were able to provide
small quantities as they captured ships carrying rare foods. Local auctioneers auctioned
off the goods after prize courts determined their value. Since the majority of prize courts
were located in port cities, people seeking these goods would flock to the port cities for
auctions.87
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While American privateers helped the US economy during the war, the British economy
was negatively affected by privateer action. Throughout the war, the British government
and British merchants faced increased financial difficulties. For the government, the
difficulties came from lower revenue and an increased military budget in order to protect
trade interests. For merchants, increased insurance rates, the loss of vessels, and the
introduction of new duties created additional expenses throughout the war.88
The British government saw decreased revenue from duties and taxes. The
decrease in revenue was approximately 11 million pounds over the course of the war,
which was equivalent to roughly $58 million in US dollars. The decrease was significant
because defense spending was increasing at the same time. Not only was Britain engaged
in the War of 1812, but it was also faced with the Napoleonic Wars with France. Still, the
most significant drops occurred during lulls of the Napoleonic wars, while the War of
1812 was in full effect. This is mainly due to the efforts of privateers and the effects they
had as they captured a significant number of British ships.89
In total, privateers were responsible for the capture of 1,509 British merchant
vessels. The loss of these vessels played an important economic impact on the British
merchants, as these ships often cost more than $20,000. In addition, Britain did not have
the raw material to build new ships and had to wait until the end of the war for the
construction of new trading vessels. To make matters worse for the merchants, the loss of
ships was not the biggest economic hit accrued during the war effort.90
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While the loss of British ships was significant, lost cargo served as a bigger blow
to the British economy. Throughout the war, cargo played an important role in both the
British and American militaristic strategies. For the British, the goal of the blockade was
to put a stranglehold on American shipping in hopes that a lack of supplies would bring
about a faster end to the war. In comparison, American privateers were used to negatively
affect the British shipping industry while simultaneously bringing goods into the nation.
The American strategy caused a loss of nearly $45 million in British ships and cargo. The
majority of the cargo was sugar, flour, indigo, and rice. Many other types of cargo were
also lost, including letters and packages. These losses negatively impacted British
citizen’s views of the war, making the war effort even more difficult to fund publicly.91
One of the major effects privateers had on the British shipping industry was an
increase of shipping insurance rates. Prior to the start of the war, insurance rates hovered
around 2.5% of the cargo’s value. Throughout the course of the war, the rate rapidly
increased, eventually reaching 20% of the cargo’s value. This dissuaded some merchants
from shipping their goods, creating a deficit in revenue, as the goods were not able to be
sold. Some merchants who chose to continue shipping their goods decided not to
purchase insurance due to the extremely high rates. If these ships were captured, the
financial burden and responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of the merchant.
Merchants had severe, negative financial impacts as a result, and few even neared
bankruptcy.92
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In order to combat the financial burden faced by merchants, the British Royal
Navy was forced to begin conducting compulsory escorts. The Compulsory Escort Act
required the British Royal Navy to escort merchant vessels to and from their destinations.
Nevertheless, the practice encountered many logistical issues. Slower merchant vessels
often lagged behind the military ships, leaving them fair game for privateers and
rendering the act completely ineffective. In addition, a number of ships left the escort
early. Although leaving early was prohibited by the act, merchants were eager to be the
first to port and make the most amount of money possible from their cargo.
Unfortunately, privateers knew this and were then able to pick off ships that decided to
leave the escort early. Another major issue with using military ships as escorts was that
they had to leave the line of duty in the blockade in order to chaperone the merchant
vessels’ voyages. This created gaps in the blockade, which allowed privateers to get
through and capture more prizes.93
While the escorts did cut back on privateering, it did not completely prevent the
practice. American privateers often searched for prizes in packs. One or two of the
privateering ships acted as a decoy to pull the military ships attention away from the
merchant vessel. Additional privateers then descend upon the merchant vessel and
capture it before the military vessel knew what was happening. This system created
revenue for the US while taking it from the British.94
To pay for these compulsory convoys, the British government imposed a tax on
merchant vessels. This upset merchants, as the blockade was not protecting them to the
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degree that they had hoped. In addition, the increased insurance rates along with the
compulsory escort tax made it incredibly expensive to ship goods, increasing the negative
impact on the economy. The negative views held by British merchants and citizens
compounded with negative views held by politicians surrounding the war, led a large
population of the British to call for an end to the war so that shipping, goods, and quality
of life could return to normal.95
Throughout the war, the United States government issued letters of marque to
privateers in hopes that they would disrupt the British shipping industry. While privateers
were able to accomplish this, the government saw other benefits from their relationship
with privateers. This private maritime force provided funds to the United States, helped
build local economies, and contributed to economic losses experienced by the British
government. While the overall economic impact of American privateering was nearly
impossible to quantify, their economic effects were felt at the local, state, federal and
international levels.
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Patriotism: Privateering’s Lasting Effect

While the economic and militaristic effects of the war impacted only the war
efforts, the rise in patriotism which occurred during the period had lasting implications.
The outward expression of patriotism by authors and artists directly benefitted the
national government; yet, these two groups were not the only ones who contributed to the
rise in patriotism. The private citizens who took to the ocean as privateers also directly
contributed to the rise in love for country. Privateer contributions to the rise in patriotism
can be seen through the individual efforts of privateering captains and their crew and the
ways their actions were portrayed through public writings, songs, and newspapers.
In order to effectively discuss the rise in patriotism which occurred during the
War of 1812, the terms nationalism and patriotism must be defined and differentiated.
Thirteen years after the end of the war, Noah Webster compiled the first AmericanEnglish dictionary. In the first volume, the word nationalism did not appear, but Webster
did define the terms nation and national. Webster defined national as, “Public; general;
common to a nation.”96 Meanwhile, he defined nation as, “a body of people inhabiting
the same country, or united under the same sovereign government.”97 By combining
Webster’s definitions of these two terms, the origin of the definition of nationalism can
be determined as: the people living within a common nation under a unified government
who collectively carry out the nation’s ideology. Being “national” implied that there
should be consistency which can be applied to every citizen, such as beliefs, religion, and
language that were consistent across the population.
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In comparison, Webster defined patriotism as, “love of one’s country; the passion
which aims to serve one’s country, either in defending it from invasion, or protecting its
rights and maintaining its laws and institutions in vigor and purity. Patriotism is the
characteristic of a good citizen, the noblest passion that animates a man in the character
of a citizen.”98 According to Webster’s early definition, patriotism was simply loving
one’s country and possessing a willingness to uphold the ideas upon which the country is
founded.
The unifying link between these two definitions is the focus on the citizen. In his
first dictionary, Webster defined a citizen as: “an inhabitant who enjoys the freedoms and
privileges of the city or country in which he resides.”99 In addition, Webster also included
an additional definition specifying what it meant to be a citizen in the United States. “In
the United States, a person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the
elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to
purchase and hold real estate.”100 While Webster’s initial definition seemed to include all
individuals living within a city or country’s area, his expansion made evident that not all
people living within the United States were afforded citizenship.
The major differentiating factor between nationalism and patriotism is the acting
body. Nationalism focuses on the citizenry as a whole and intended that there were
common beliefs and traits held among all people living within the nation. On the other
hand, patriotism focuses more on individual actions and how the individual perceives
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their relationship to the nation. Due to these differences between patriotism and
nationalism, patriotism is more fitting in this instance.
At the onset of the War of 1812, merchants and sailors began applying for
commissions to become privateers almost immediately. The desire of private shipowning men to become part of the war is made evident through documents such as James
De Wolf’s appeal to the Secretary of Defense to allow his brig Yankee to receive a
privateering commission.101 Just twelve days after the declaration of war, De Wolf writes:
Sir; I have purchased a now ready for sea, armed brig, (one of the most suitable in
this country for a privateer) of one hundred and sixty tons burden, mounting
eighteen guns, and carries one hundred and twenty men, called the Yankee,
commanded by Oliver Wilson. Being desirous that she should be on her cruise as
soon as possible I beg that you will cause a commission to be forwarded as soon
as practicable to the Collector of the District, that this vessel may not be detained.
Like De Wolf, hundreds of other men up and down the east coast sent letters during the
onset of the war to ask for permission to sail as privateers. In total, the United States
government issued letters of marque to more than 500 American ships, with more than
50,000 crew members. The increase in sailors applying for commissions led the United
States to find itself with an array of powerful ships and valuable resources that it could
use to negatively affect the British shipping industry. The men volunteering to serve the
United States without compensation up front were primarily driven to do so by the money
they stood to gain if they captured a foreign merchant ship. Nevertheless, a sense of duty
and the value of patriotism also played a role in the privateers’ involvement. The
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importance of national pride for the captains and crew became particularly apparent as
the war progressed.102
One of the most prominent privateers who exemplified patriotism during the war
was Commodore Joshua Barney. Barney was born in the British colony of Maryland in
July of 1759 and became a prominent war hero in both the Revolutionary War and the
War of 1812. He began his sailing career in 1771 at the age of twelve aboard his brothersin-law’s merchant ship Sidney. It was on the Sidney that Barney had his first experience
as a maritime captain after his brother-in-law died on a trip to Nice, France in 1775. After
becoming the captain of the ship, Barney was faced with several challenges he had to
overcome to complete the journey. First, the ship sprung a leak. To make matters more
difficult, violent storms formed around the ship, threatening the survival of both the crew
and cargo. In the face of these issues, Barney and his crew were able to patch the hull and
navigate through the storm to reach Gibraltar. Barney’s first experience leading a crew
was not his last. By the time Barney returned the Sidney to America, the Revolutionary
War had begun and Barney knew he wanted to be involved.103
Barney knew that he did not want to serve on a privateering vessel, so he traveled
to Philadelphia, the capital of the new nation, in search of a commission in the newly
formed Continental Navy. Upon his arrival, Barney quickly received interest and offers
for office positions from the captains of both the Wasp and Hornet. Barney ultimately
accepted the offer from the Hornet because it offered him the position of master’s mate,
George C. Daughan, 1812: The Navy’s War, (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 147; Sir John Borlase
Warren, Sir John Borlase Warren to Secretary of the Admiralty John W. Croker, 29 December, 1812.
Letter from The National Archives, London,
https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/results/r/2?_q=December%2029%201812%20Warren.
103
Louis Norton, Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 2000), 4-7; Hulbert Footner, Sailor of Fortune: The Life an Adventures of Commodore Barney, USN
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1940), 3-5.
102

50
whereas the Wasp only offered the position of second mate. Barney’s new position placed
him third in line to become a captain and charged him with the duty of recruiting sailors
to man the ship, all at the age of sixteen. Before setting sail on the Hornet, the ship and
the crew received the flag of Grand Union, which served as an early prototype of the
American Flag. Barney later recounted that receiving and raising this flag created a
“patriotic stir” among those serving on the Hornet.104
In total, Barney spent less than one year on the Hornet before transferring to the
Wasp to further his military service. During his time aboard the Wasp, the ship was
involved in a two-day Battle in the Delaware. After the battle, Captain Charles Alexander
made mention of Master’s Mate Barney’s “meritorious conduct,” and urged his superiors
to promote Barney. Following Captain Alexander’s report, Barney received a letter
asking him to report to the office of Robert Morris who promoted him to the position of
Lieutenant in the Constitutional Navy and transferred him to the ship Sachem. Barney
carried the rank of lieutenant for the remainder of his time in the Continental Navy,
during which he served aboard the Sachem before he transferred one final time to the
Andrea Doria.105
When Barney finished his career in the Continental Navy, his career at sea was far
from over. Between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, Barney chose to focus
on his political and business life. Barney turned down a commission as a captain in the
United States Navy and instead became a merchant in Baltimore and ran for congress on
several occasions. Although he was never elected to the United States Congress, Joshua
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Barney felt as though he had more to offer his nation and continued to try to make his
presence known. Following the Chesapeake-Leopold incident in 1807, Barney tried to
serve his nation through alternate means when he reached out to President Thomas
Jefferson to offer his services. Even though Jefferson did not push for military action at
that point, Barney ultimately got the chance to serve his country again during the War of
1812.106
Following the declaration of war in June of 1812, Joshua Barney quickly decided
to become involved in the war effort. He feared that he would not receive a commission
in the United States Navy, since he had previously turned down an offer, and decided to
turn to privateering as a means of participating in the war effort. In doing so, Barney
became the captain of the nighty-eight-foot schooner Rossie. After taking control of the
Rossie, Barney and the schooner’s owners reached out to congress and President James
Madison in hopes of securing a letter of marque. Twenty days after the declaration of
war, Congress and the President rewarded Barney for his previous service by presenting
him with the first letter of marquee issued in the War of 1812. After receiving the
government’s blessing to act as a privateer during the war, Barney ordered his men to get
the Rossie ready for sail.107
As a privateer, Captain Joshua Barney conducted two cruises aboard the Rossie.
During his first trip, Barney and his men sailed off the coasts of Canada and New
England and captured eighteen British merchant vessels. While Barney found success at
sea, not everything about his experience on the Rossie was positive. During his initial
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trip, Barney was forced to deal with American civilians and even members of his own
crew who did not meet the level of patriotism he had come to expect. One of the first
examples was recounted on September 2, 1812 when Barney reprimanded a member of
his crew for “cowardice and flying from his quarters in time of action.”108 Another
instance of occurred later in September after the Rossie captured the British ship Jeanie.
When he searched the Jeanie’s crew, Barney discovered that one of the men serving
aboard the ship was an American citizen working for and fighting amongst the British.
Barney sent the man and a letter to Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry stating:
I have sent on board your Vessel, a man by the name of Thomas Holden, he was
taken by the private armed schooner Rossie, under my command, when Chief
Mate of the British Ship Jeanie which ship engaged me. I find by his papers that
he is a Citizen of the U.S. and that he has been employed onboard one of the
public vessels, having taken him in Arms against his Country, I have thought
proper to deliver him over to the Authority of the Country, and in consequence
have sent him on board your Vessel and with him, the papers found in his
possession proving his Citizenship, to be dealt according to the Law.109
Through these actions, Barney demonstrated that his involvement in privateering had just
as much to do with patriotism as it did with profit.110
After handing off his prisoner to the U.S. Navy, Barney set sail for the Caribbean
in hopes of capturing more British ships. Soon after arriving in the Caribbean, Barney
encountered the packet HMS Princess Amelia. The encounter between the Rossie and
HMS Princess Amelia lasted over an hour and left two British sailors dead and injured
both six British sailors and six of the Rossie’s own crewmen. The battled effectively
ended Captain Barney’s career as a privateer because the Rossie was too damaged to
continue sailing in search of prizes. When he returned to the United States, Barney was
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quickly deemed to be a war hero for his actions in the battle with HMS Princess Amelia.
In addition, the fight was later commemorated through a painting at demonstrating the
patriotism and power of American maritime forces.111
Although Barney’s time as a privateer lasted less than a year, his service to the
United States continued throughout the war effort. After his return to Maryland, Barney
reached out to the Secretary of the Navy, William Jones, with a detailed plan to protect
the Chesapeake Bay. Barney’s plan led him to receive a commission as a captain in the
United States Navy. Barney was tasked with the management of a flotilla in the
Chesapeake Bay that aimed to prevent the British from reaching Washington D.C. and
Baltimore.112 Unfortunately, Barney’s flotilla was no match for the British Royal Navy
and was pushed back into the Patuxent River where Barney was ultimately forced to
destroy the majority of the ships under his command.113
Even after his naval force was defeated, Barney was not willing to allow the
British to destroy the capital without at least one more fight. Barney saved some of the
cannons from his vessels and ordered his men to drag them across land, as they were to
be used in the August 24, 1814, Battle of Bladensburg. Again, Barney faced defeat, but
this time, he also suffered the only major injury of his maritime career. During the course
of Battle, Barney was shot in the leg, and the bullet was lodged so deep that surgeons
were unable to remove it. The injury ended Barney’s career in the Navy, and
complications from the injury led to the patriot’s death just three years after the end of the
war.114
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While Captain Barney carried his sense of patriotism into the war, other privateers
developed their patriotic sentiments as the war effort progressed. One privateering
captain who demonstrated increased patriotism as the war progressed was Thomas Boyle.
Boyle was born in Massachusetts and began his sailing career at a young age when he
became a crew member of a merchant marine vessel at the age of eleven. Boyle quickly
moved up the ranks and became a captain at the age of sixteen. Prior to the outbreak of
the war, Boyle moved to Baltimore where he later captained the Comet and subsequently
the Chasseur during the war. As a captain of these two ships, Boyle conducted five
cruises, four of which produced a profit. During his cruises, Boyle became one of the
most successful privateering captains and captured a total of fifty four British merchant
vessels and one British Royal Navy ship.115
Although Boyle became involved in the war less than a month after it was
declared by Congress, a sense of patriotism did not appear in his actions during the first
year of the war. It was not until Boyle competed his second privateering voyage that his
sense of patriotism became apparent. When Boyle returned from his section voyage in
April of 1813, a blockade by the British Royal Navy made it extremely difficult for ships
to leave the Chesapeake Bay. Instead of using time to take care of personal affairs, Boyle
instead became a Sailing Master in the United States Navy. During his stint in the Navy,
Boyle and his men were stationed in the bay to monitor movement of the British fleet.
Although Boyle’s service in the Navy demonstrated the development of his patriotism,
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his time in service did not last long. Instead, Boyle left the Navy at the end of August in
1813 to conduct another privateering cruise aboard the Comet.116
Nevertheless, following his time in the military, Thomas Boyle’s patriotism only
became more pronounced as the war progressed. His rise in patriotism was most apparent
when he left the Comet to become captain of the Chasseur. By this point in the war, the
British blockade had severely restricted the ability of American merchants to leave
American ports. In response, when Boyle and his men found themselves off the coast of
the British Isles in search of prizes, Boyle snuck in to London on October 24, 1814 and
posted a notice on the Lloyd’s Coffeehouse door. It read as follows:
Whereas, It has become customary with the admirals of Great Britain,
commanding small forces on the coast of the United States, particularly with Sir
John Borlaise Warren and Sir Alexander Cochrane, to declare all the coast of the
said United States in a state of strict and rigorous blockade without possessing the
power to justify such a declaration or stationing an adequate force to maintain
said blockade; I do therefore, by virtue of the power and authority in me vested
(possessing sufficient force), declare all the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers,
inlets, outlets, islands, and seacoast of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland in a state of strict and rigorous blockade. And I do further declare that I
consider the force under my command adequate to maintain strictly, rigorously,
and effectually the said blockade. And I do hereby require the respective officers,
whether captains, commanders, or commanding officers, under my command,
employed or to be employed, on the coasts of England, Ireland, and Scotland, to
pay strict attention to the execution of this my proclamation. And I do hereby
caution and forbid the ships and vessels of all and every nation in amity and peace
with the United States from entering or attempting to enter, or from coming or
attempting to come out of, any of the said ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers,
inlets, outlets, islands, or seacoast under any pretense whatsoever. And that no
person may plead ignorance of this, my proclamation, I have ordered the same to
be made public in England. Given under my hand on board the Chasseur. Thomas
Boyle by command of the commanding officer. J.J. Stanbury, Secretary.117
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The note proclaimed that the British Isles were under a blockade conducted by Boyle and
his men in response to the British Royal Navy’s blockade in the United States. His note
demonstrated true patriotism because he was willing to act on behalf of the United States
when the United States Navy was unable to do so, despite the fact that there was no real
benefit for him. Boyle’s proclamation not only scared British merchants enough to lead to
a hike in shipping insurance rates, but it also led the British Royal Navy to send out 14
ships in search of the Chasseur.118
Boyle’s final and most famous displays of patriotism occurred with the attack and
capture of the HMS St. Lawrence on February 26, 1815. During his last cruise as a
privateer, Boyle mistook the St. Lawrence as a trading vessel and decided to approach.
When he saw that it was not a trading vessel, he attacked, saying, “The honor of the flag
entrusted to my charge was not to be disgraced by flight.”119 The battle lasted for 15
minutes, until the St. Lawrence surrendered to the Chasseur. As the exchange
demonstrates, Boyle and his men possessed such patriotic sentiment that they were not
willing to dishonor their country by fleeing from danger.120
Another privateer who became known for his patriotism was Jean Lafitte.121
Lafitte, who is of French origin, operated out of the Gulf of Mexico and became involved
in both the War of 1812 and the Mexican War for Independence. While he only offered
his services to the United States for a short period of time during the War of 1812, he had
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a profound effect on the Battle of New Orleans. Lafitte’ actions during this battle
demonstrated his patriotism.
Lafitte was not always a likely ally to the US in the Battle of New Orleans. He
had strained relations with the US government because the government classified Lafitte
and his men as pirates. The US often sent military forces to Lafitte’s base on an island in
Barataria Bay, Louisiana. On November 14, 1814, the governor of Louisiana even
offered $500 for the capture of Jean Lafitte.122 Lafitte was ultimately captured but
managed to escape. As a result, the US Navy decided to burn six of his ships so that he
was not able to continue on in his piracy.123
Given the strained relationship between Lafitte and the US government, the
British government offered Lafitte and his crew a package in exchange for their aid
against the Americans at the Battle of New Orleans. The British Royal Navy sent Captain
Nicholas Lockyer to Barataria in August of 1814 and offered to grant Lafitte and his men
British citizenship and land in the United States following the end of the war in return for
their assistance. Lafitte was also presented with a letter from the Commander of the
British Royal Navy that offered him captaincy and 1,000 pounds for payment. In
response, Lafitte instructed his men to lock Lockyer up overnight. Lockyer was
ultimately released the next morning and sent back to his ship with a letter asking for
time to think about the offer.124
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After Lockyer’s departure, Jean Lafitte turned over information of the British plan
to United States officials. The Governor of Louisiana, William C.C. Claiborne, responded
by writing to General Andrew Jackson saying, “Lafitte and his associates might be useful
to us.”125 Meanwhile, Lafitte’s lawyer, Edward Livingston, began writing letters to
President James Madison and Andrew Jackson asking that the Lafitte brothers and their
men be offered pardons in exchange for helping the United States defend Louisiana from
British attack.126 Despite the valuable information Lafitte provided and Governor
Claiborne’s insistence that Lafitte and his men be allowed to help, the United States
government did not negotiate with Livingston before the arrival of the British in New
Orleans. Andrew Jackson still harbored too much animosity and referred to the pirates
from Barataria as “hellish banditti.”127
After the British arrived in New Orleans, the United States realized that they
needed the help of Lafitte, his men, and his supplies. Governor Claiborne and the
Louisiana State government offered Lafitte and his men a pardon in exchange for their
military service. Both Jean and Pierre Lafitte found themselves assigned to Andrew
Jackson’s headquarters staff, where they served as guides and messengers. In addition to
the two brothers, nearly three hundred of Lafitte’s men also served during the battle, the
majority of which were assigned to man artillery teams. The service these men provided
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led General Andrew Jackson’s proclamation following the battle to have a section
dedicated to the Baratarians. Jackson stated:
Captains Dominique and Belluche, lately commanding privateers at Barataria,
with part of their former crew and many brave citizens of New Orleans, were
stationed at [batteries] Nos. 3 and 4. The general cannot avoid giving his warm
approbation of the manner in which these gentlemen have uniformly conducted
themselves while under his command, and of the gallantry with which they have
redeemed the pledge they gave at opening of the campaign to defend the country.
The brothers Lafitte have exhibited the same courage and fidelity; and the general
promises that the government shall be duly apprised of their conduct.128
During the battle, these pirates turned privateers placed themselves in harm’s way in
order to further the American cause.129
Jean Lafitte’s reasons for fighting alongside the Americans during the Battle of
New Orleans can be seen as being beneficial to himself and his men, but his patriotic
values also played at least some part in his involvement. His actions leading up to the
battle make the value of his patriotism clear. For example, Lafitte received an offer from
the British Royal Navy and could have decided to fight for the British. Instead, he
decided not to because he felt as though the United States was his home. Even after the
end of the war when Lafitte continued to smuggle goods into the country, he also
continued to publicly announce his support for the United States. Lafitte was even quoted
as saying, “Whether I am traveling or at home, I always have the American flag hoisted
and have always revered and cherished it with great respect.”130
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Captains were not the only ones enticed to take up privateering in hopes of
gaining a profit. Many amateur sailors and even some farmers throughout the eastern
United States left their homes in hopes of joining a privateering vessel in pursuit of
economic gain. While profit was the goal for the majority of men who joined privateering
crews, patriotic sentiment among members of the crew began to increase as they
participated in subsequent cruises. The journal of a privateersman aboard the Yankee
showed the rise in patriotism. Noah Johnson, who referred to himself as a wanderer
during his first two cruises aboard the ship, kept a daily journal where he documented
what occurred aboard the ship. The journal from the first cruise stated only factual
information, but the journal from the second cruise began to record a number of his
personal thoughts and beliefs.
In particular, the second journal began to discuss the rise in patriotic values
amongst Johnson and the other crew members. On the first day of the second cruise,
Johnson noted some of the customs carried out by the privateers on the ship. One custom
Johnson described was cheering on other privateers they encountered because they were
seen as beneficial for the nation. In addition to this, Johnson noted that whenever the ship
passed a United States military base, the privateers appeared on deck to salute the
members of the military. Johnson specifically recounted the feelings of one of his
crewmates: “Horatio deeply felt all the emotions of the lover, friend, relation, and
patriot.”131 The entries made by Johnson signifies that privateering was more than just a
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way to make money; crewmembers truly felt as though the sacrifices and danger they
faced were contributing to the larger success of the nation as a whole.132
While it is unlikely that all 50,000 plus men who participated in privateering
during the war felt patriotic sentiment, surviving journals and ship logs make it apparent
that a large number of men did develop some level of patriotism during the course of the
war. The patriotic values and their resulting actions did not go unnoticed by the United
States government. Several years after the war, in 1817, the Senate introduced a
reparation to a privateering vessel that demonstrated bravery and courage on behalf of the
nation. The general of the ship, Captain Reid, engaged in a battle with the British Royal
Navy that he knew he could not win. Still, Captain Reid was able to disable three British
Royal Naval vessels before being forced to abandon his own ship and set it on fire. Given
his actions, the Senate allotted $10,000 to be split among the captain and crew of the
ship. The United States government publicly acknowledged the patriotism privateers
showed through their actions.133
Privateers were not the only ones who initially motivated to join the war effort for
financial gain. The merchants who provided their vessels to privateers also hoped to earn
a profit. Yet, over time, the effect of growing patriotism in the United States also came to
play some role in the merchants’ actions. Throughout the war, the majority of the
privateers received their ships from northern merchants. Many of these northern
merchants belonged to the federalist party and initially opposed the war, but their position
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shifted as privateers brought them increased profit. Moreover, more than one-fifth of each
port city was invested in privateering, which led people throughout port cities to become
more involved in one another’s lives and to give one another greater support. While there
was economic interest attached to the greater sense of communal support, it also
demonstrated that people within port cities wanted the privateers and other Americans to
succeed. Overall, merchants and investors in the war may have been motivated primarily
be profit, but patriotic support became a byproduct of their experience.134

The increase in patriotic sentiment was not limited to those involved in the war
effort. There was also an increase in patriotism at home. One measure of the rise in
support is the music American citizens were creating. Throughout the war, US citizens
began writing songs about almost every aspect of the world around them. One of the
more popular topics during the period became the effects of privateers on the war effort.
The songs about privateers began to appear at the beginning of the war and continued to
be created well after the war’s end.
Song were written about numerous privateering ships, but the General Armstrong
of New York had more songs written about it than any other. In total, the ship was the
subject of five song. The first song, “The General Armstrong,” was published in March
of 1813 and recounted the bravery of the ship’s men when they were under the attack of a
British Royal Navy ship. Through the song, the author made clear that the captain of the
ship placed patriotism above all else. The author described the captain’s actions after
receiving an injury, writing: “His wound was quickly dress’d, while he in his cabin lay;
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The doctor, while attending, these words he heard him say: Our “Our Yankee flag shall
flourish,” our noble captain cried, “Before that we do strike, my boys, we’ll sink
alongside.” The author’s writing demonstrated that, for the privateering captain, honoring
the nation and the flag by fighting was more important than the possibility of dying. The
ship survived the encounter described in, “The General Armstrong,” but subsequent
songs were written only after the ship sank.135
In September of 1814, the General Armstrong anchored off the coast of the
Portuguese island of Fayal. While anchored, the ship was approached by two British
Royal Navy vessels and was sunk after a long battle. After the ship was sank, four more
songs were written about it. Tales of the bravery of the captain and crew reached
America, and songs discussing bravery on the ship quickly began to appear. The most
famous of these songs was Philip Freneau’s “On the Loss of the Privateer Brigantine
General Armstrong.”136 In his song, Freneau recounted the bravery demonstrated by the
captain and crew of the General Armstrong and the damage they were able to cause
before they met their fateful end. Freneau ended the song with an attempt to bring about a
sense of patriotism by writing: “Now in bumpers of reason, success to brave Reid!
Himself and his heroes are heroes indeed! In conquests, like this, can an Englishman
glory, One traitor among us, one Halifax tory? If they can let them brag Here’s success to
our flag! May it ever be ready, the britons to maul, As the Armstrong behaved in the road
of Fayal.”137
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Another patriotic expression came about in October of 1813 after the capture of a
British packet by the privateering vessel Saratoga.138 During the battle, the Saratoga had
only seven guns while the packet it faced had eighteen. Despite its disadvantage, the
privateering vessel was able to capture the British after a little over an hour of fighting.
Following the capture, a song was soon written to honor the Saratoga and its
accomplishment. In the song, “Another Glorious Victory,” the author writes, “The genius
replied, Of my sons I’m quite proud/Their glory is bright, nor is stain’d with a cloud/And
they ne’er shall disgrace of their country the name/But shall fill with their deeds many
pages of fame.” The lyrics demonstrated the pride that citizens felt toward the privateers
and their actions. The line, “They ne’er shall disgrace of their country the name,”
signified that the author and those around him recognized the Saratoga’s bravery in the
face of danger, and ultimate sacrifice they were willing to make to defend their
country.139
Privateering vessels had a duty to capture British merchant ships and their cargo.
Their duty did not include engaging with the British Royal Navy; yet, many encounters
with the British Royal Navy still occurred. In fact, all of the privateering songs pay
homage to the encounters between privateers and the British Royal Navy. Privateers were
not responsible for engaging in these encounters, and the crew of privateering ships were
largely untrained as fighters. As a result, when privateers defeated the British at battled it
created a sense of superiority and pride in the country. In the song, “Brilliant Victory,”
the author wrote about the “bravery, skill and courage” of the privateering vessel
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Decatur, which defeated a 16-gun British Schooner, Dominico.140 In the description of
the battle, the author wrote about the “valor most undaunted” and “destruction to them
dealt/Such as Freemen give to Tyrants.” This, paired with imagery of a jovial and
triumphant crew as “their Flag of Union dowsed/When the Yankee flag appeared,”
signified the actions taken by privateers solely to defend their country. While the Decatur
was not required to overtake the British ship, the crew chose to do so because of the sense
of duty and pride they felt towards their country.141
A final song that focused on the actions of privateers is the “Yankee Privateer.” In
this song, the author looked at a whale-boat from Portland, Maine and its ability to
succeed in making a capture, despite its inability to sail far from shore. The author wrote,
“Then on the deck as raised, The little privateer, And full of fun and humor, Away from
home they steer. So proud the little whale-boat, Which runs along the side, Of a large
British vessel, Upon her deck did ride. Ye Jolly Privateersmen, Now fill the flowing can,
And toast the vent’rous seaman, Who the little boat did man. The Britons who so
haughty, Have rode upon the sea, Have found that e’en a whale-boat, A match for them
can be.” The author used these lyrics to create a sense of superiority among American’s,
as compared to the British. Furthermore, the author demonstrated that there should be
pride in American privateers because even the smallest ones were productive in the war
effort.142
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Music was not the only published medium that demonstrated support for
privateering actions during the war. Newspapers were also widely used to express
patriotic ideologies. Throughout the country, editors published the captures, heroic
actions, and triumphs of privateers. The Niles Weekly Register, published by Hezekiah
Niles in Baltimore, complied and published all of the actions of privateers throughout the
week. The paper focused on the positive aspects of privateering and often left out any
British captures of American crews. The paper wanted to demonstrate how successful
American privateers were in order to encourage support from citizens during the war. On
April 15, 1815, Niles published some of the captures made by American privateers
during August of 1814. He listed more than 40 ships taken by American privateers and
stated what they were carrying and any known values. 143
Newspapers did not have to focus on the positive aspects of privateering in order
to influence the patriotic sentiment felt among the general population. Another tactic was
for newspapers to print ways the public could support the privateers. For example, in the
August issue of the American and Commercial Daily Advertiser, the author discussed the
ship building industry and how ship builders demonstrated patriotism through their
contribution to the privateering industry. The paper also considered men who funded the
building of additional ships to be patriotic because they allowed an increased number of
privateers to sail under the American flag.144
Newspapers also called into question the patriotism of the individuals who did not
support the privateers. The Essex Register of Salem, Massachusetts published an article

143

Timothy S. Good, American Privateers in the War of 1812: The Vessels and Their Prizes as Recorded in
Niles’ Weekly Register, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Inc., 2012), 3;110.
144
“Ferry Point,” American and Commerical Daily Advertiser (Baltimore, Maryland), Aug. 8, 1812.

67
titled “Outrage,” on July 25, 1812 that discussed a privateering vessel that was sunk by
an unknown group while it was sitting in port being fitted for voyage. The author of the
article placed the blame on Federalist supporters, as they had been in opposition to the
war, and called into question the patriotism of the Federalists in the area. The article
emphasized the patriotic nature of privateering because it deemed those who did not
support privateers and their actions to be unpatriotic themselves.145
Other instances of privateering vessels being destroyed or tampered with in
American ports called for the public’s patriotism to shine through to help find the
culprits. On August 20, 1812, John Everingham and Thomas Jervey took out an ad in the
City Gazette of Charleston, South Carolina to look for help identifying the people who
destroyed seven guns on the privateer Saucy Jack. In the ad, the two men wrote “It is
confidently hoped that every good citizen and real American will exert himself to find out
and drag to light the secret enemies of our country, who thus daringly attempt to set at
naught the patriotic efforts of our citizens and clandestinely cooperate with out
implacable enemy.”146 In comparison to the article in the Essex Register, Federalists were
not called into question because the Republican party dominated the south. Instead, the
ad used language that was intended to give the citizenry a sense of patriotism by claiming
that any “real American” would help find the culprit. Moreover, the ad used the term
union and American, which demonstrated how the sense of patriotism and unity were
spreading throughout the nation. Finally, by calling people to action in support of the
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privateering vessel, the ad demonstrated how highly people thought of the privateers and
the role they played in the rising American patriotic ideology.147
During the war, newspapers began to focus on Baltimore as a patriotic city
because the city sent out more privateers than any other port city. In an August issue of
the American and Commercial Daily Advertiser, the author of an article stated, “Fifty-six
privateers are ascertained to have already gone to sea from the several ports in the United
States. With pride and pleasure we think that the patriotic order of Baltimore has placed
her far above the union on the list.”148 While this paper had some bias because it was
printed in Baltimore, it still demonstrated that the entire city of Baltimore was seen as
patriotic because they produced so many privateers.
By the end of the war, American citizens from nearly every socioeconomic status
had begun to show patriotism and appreciation for those who served during the war.
These feelings became particularly evident as privateers returned following their cruises.
During the first few years of the war, there were very few instances where crowds
gathered in order to welcome home the privateers and offer gratitude for their
contributions to the war. By the end of the war, an increased number of privateering ship
ledgers noted the welcome home parties that awaited their return. For example, when the
Chasseur returned to Baltimore following its last voyage one onlooker recorded, “On
entering the port, the Chasseur saluted Fort McHenry in a handsome style. Her brave
captain and crew were welcomed by all classes of the community for their service to state
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and country.”149 The onlooker’s statement demonstrated that during the war, privateers
were seen as patriotic men. In addition, the large crowds that showed up to greet these
men at port indicated that American citizens felt at least some degree of patriotic support
for the actions of privateers.150
Historical documents and media sources from the period show that the War of
1812 was important in shaping the cultural identity of America. Although almost 30 years
had passed since the Revolutionary War ended in 1783, the country as a whole had still
yet to find its identity as an independent nation. While many authors and historians do not
directly attribute this rise in cultural identity and patriotic values to privateers, their
efforts and bravery in the face of danger contributed to the rise in patriotism that swept
through the nation.
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Epilogue
Throughout the War of 1812, American privateers became an active part of the
United States government’s strategy to defeat the British. This private maritime force
provided militaristic support by affecting both the British Royal Navy as well as the
British shipping industry. Additionally, privateering efforts contributed a significant
amount financially to a government that was not economically prepared for a costly war.
Finally, privateers demonstrated patriotic sentiment and became active members of an
overall growing sense of pride within the nation. While these individuals positively
contributed in a number of ways during the overall war effort, their effects were not
enough to help the United States defeat the British. Instead, both sides gained no real
advantage over the other, leading to discussions of peace beginning in August of 1814.
With both sides agreeing that the war needed to end, leaders from the United
States and Britain began negotiations in Ghent, United Netherlands.151 On the American
side of the table, John Quincy Adams led the discussion with help from Albert Gallatin,
Henry Clay, James A. Bayard, and Johnathan Russel. Their British counterparts included
several minor British officials who were in close contact with their superiors in England.
While both groups entered the negotiations seeking peace, neither began without seeking
concessions from the other. Coming into the negotiations, president James Madison
advised American leaders to push for an agreement to end the impressment of American
sailors and seek to gain the Canadian territories from Britain. Counter to these points,
British officials sought to establish an Indian barrier territory in the northwestern United
States and gain transit rights along the Mississippi River. Both sides rejected the other’s
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propositions leading to nearly four more months of war before a treaty was agreed
upon.152
In December of 1814, British and American leaders finally came to this
agreement. In this, neither side made concessions, but both agreed to return all captured
prisoners, ships, and land to the opposing nation. In addition, Britain also agreed to return
any captured American slaves or pay for those which they had already freed. While both
nations agreed to these terms, the United States was able to secure the rights of the sailors
which had been a major factor leading to the declaration of the war. These terms formed
the Treaty of Ghent and were agreed upon on December 24, 1814, effectively ending the
war after ratification by both nations.153
With a formal declaration of peace in place, the majority of soldiers, sailors, and
privateers were able to return home to their normal lives. For some privateers, this meant
returning to the jobs they had before the war either aboard merchant ships or as farmers.
Others enjoyed a lengthy retirement living on the money they made from their shares of
captures. Still others were not so willing to give up the lucrative privateering lifestyle.
This meant sailing to South and Central American territories which had begun their own
fights for independence from European nations. In total, more than three thousand
American sailors headed to Central and South America in order to continue their work as
privateers. While thousands of American sailors saw this opportunity as a chance to make
money, their actions placed American political leaders in a difficult position. For a nation
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who was pushing for safe, secure, and neutral waterways, having Americans attacking
and looting Spanish, British, and French ships created a complex political landscape for
American presidents and secretaries of state.154
With privateering playing such a large role in the fight against European control
of the Americas in the first half of the 19th century, the practice of employing a private
maritime force came under attack later in the century. This charge against privateering
came into full effect with the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856. In
this, France and Britain co-wrote a set of maritime laws to govern those nations which
signed the pact. Key features of this document included laws governing free trade,
blockades, and most importantly privateering. While this agreement acted as the
precursor for banning the practice of using a private maritime force, it only affected those
nations which signed the declaration from using privateers against one another. However,
the United States refused to sign the pact, as the nation believed they may need privateers
to supplement their small navy in the future. While the American government did not
sign the declaration, they have not used privateers since the War of 1812.155
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